The US-Japan security arrangements have formed one of the most significant pillars of Japan’s security strategy ever since the end of the Second World War. However, what is noteworthy is the incremental growth in the Japanese profile within the alliance, from the time of its inception to the present. This paper traces the growing Japanese role within the alliance and argues that the relationship is likely to remain robust in the foreseeable future. Japan’s changing security policy as well as its augmented role within the parameters of the partnership has ensured that the alliance has made a marked shift from being asymmetrical to a mutually beneficial and reciprocal arrangement.
Iran-Pakistan relations have had a distinct characteristic over the past five decades and Islamabad’s clandestine transfer of nuclear technology and materials to Iran underlines its significance. Political and strategic imperatives have formed the basis of their close relationship despite divergence of interests and political outlook on regional and global issues. Both the countries have tried to reconcile the differences and consolidate their ties. Iran’s concerns regarding the perceived dangers of containment by the US, the challenges flowing from developments in Iraq and Afghanistan, the need to ensure balance of power with Saudi Arabia and earlier Iraq, and its concerns about the sectarian violence in Pakistan have deeply influenced the vitality of Iran-Pakistan relationship. This paper traces the evolution of Iran- pakistan relations and argues that the politico-strategic contours of the South-West Asian region will be shaped as a result of divergent developments in Iran and Pakistan – Iran’s improvements in ties with India and Pakistan’s relations with the US.
Afghanistan once represented a fragmented and failed socio-economic and political entity. Operation Enduring Freedom, while targeting the Taliban and Al Qaida as part of the global war on terrorism helped create the structure of a new Afghan State. This article analyses the challenges faced by Afghanistan and how the new Afghan elite and its foreign supporters seek to address them through constitutional means. The New Constitution provides the framework of how Afghanistan wishes to reconstruct the new State. While it does concede the right of popular participation, its highly centralised form of government and unitary system that sidelines the political ramifications of ethnic nationalism are likely to pose serious challenges to nation-building. It might even push the central government to rely more upon foreign forces, mostly from the NATO countries. The situation is volatile and is likely to lead to conflict escalation unless the central government as also its foreign supporters are prepared to make major compromise with local ethnic leaders/warlords, and thus bypass provisions of the Constitution. However, that will in turn set a wrong precedent for a new State.
Significant changes have been witnessed in major centres of military production in recent times. Since the end of the Cold War, indicators of military production – expenditure, R&D expenditure, demand and supply of weaponry, and others – have shown fluctuations. Military efforts of States decelerated for nearly a decade, only to rise again since the late 1990s. The changing international security scenario has necessitated such changes, to which major centres of military production have responded in many ways – efforts towards concentration, diversification, conversion and privatisation are some of the objectives that the States have strived to achieve in their defence industrial strategies. In this context, as major centres of military production, the European States have faced many challenges. A strikingly difficult task in their case has been the search of a viable unity in political and strategic terms, which could shape the defence industry, among others, to their aspirations. This paper argues that while trends in European defence industries are moving in different directions, it is the future political shape of the Union that could be the driving force. It argues that the ‘muddle through’ scenario is likely to continue for some more time amidst two opposite contemporary trends – a common European defence industrial base and a trans-Atlantic defence industry.
This article covers the problems of religious identities in two Central Asian countries – Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan – and analyses how globalisation and modernisation influenced them. International relations theories as well the sociology of religion presume that religious identity in contemporary Central Asia cannot be exclusively seen as a local product; it is of a twodimensional character and reflects both local and broad external influences. The article argues that while external dimensions are noteworthy, local developments and modernisation need elaboration. The differences in local developments and modernisation during the Soviet and the post-Soviet periods are derived from the basic difference between Kazakh and Uzbek societies as nomadic and settled ones that had various degrees of religious beliefs; more profound among the Uzbeks and less among the Kazak.
In the background of former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s obituary tribute to P.V. Narasimha Rao acknowledging the latter as the true father of Shakti nuclear test of May 11, 1998, let me recall Rao’s role in the development of the Indian nuclear deterrent as narrated by him. This is important in order to understand the correct historical perspective about very important decisions of the past; in this case, Rao’s account of the evolution of the nuclear policy during his term of office.
When the Kargil Committee wrote to Rao that they would like to meet him, he asked me to meet him alone. He was President of IDSA from 1980 to 1987 when I was its Director. We had, therefore, known each other over a period of years. In the meeting, taking advantage of Rao’s offer to discuss on the nuclear issue on a one-to-one basis, I asked him why he called off the nuclear test of December 1995. He said there was no consensus on the test. There were divisions not only among the economists and administrators but also among the scientists themselves. He felt that he would conduct the test if he came back to office.
I asked him whether he did not owe it to the country and future generations to give his account of the evolution of the nuclear policy during his term of office. I also reminded him while I was not at the centre of decision-making on the nuclear issue I had been on the periphery of it. He said he was aware of it and would be prepared to talk to me in my individual capacity but not to the Kargil Committee. When I pressed him further on his obligations to future generations, he said he had an obligation only to one person and he had discharged it to the full. When I asked him who that person was, he replied “Atalji who succeeded me. I have briefed him fully.” It is obvious from his statement that he had told Atalji all he had to know.
The Kargil Committee (George Verghese) also asked him why the defence budget was cut during his time. Rao replied that was because the nuclear deterrent was under development and that had priority. Then he proceeded to tell us on his own, how the nuclear arsenal was operationalised only during his premiership. Subsequently, a record of discussion, including what he told us on the progress of the nuclear programme during his tenure, was sent to him, as was done in all other cases. I was wondering whether on second thoughts, he would cut out the portion on the nuclear issue. He did not, but signed the record as it was and returned it. One could understand why the NDA had an interest in not publishing the annexures of the Kargil report since the Rao account would have appropriated most of the credit for nuclear weapon development to the Congress. The publication of the annexures at this stage would be to the advantage of the UPA.
Perhaps it was fortunate that the tests got postponed by two years. That gave enough time for Dr Chidambaram to finalise his design of the thermo-nuclear device that was tested in May 1998. Some people have attributed Vajpayee’s determination to conduct the test to Brajesh Mishra’s urging. That raises the question how Vajpayee attempted to conduct the test during his 13-day tenure of office when Mishra was not around. Vajpayee’s present disclosure would tend to support the view that he was egged on at that time by Rao.
Rao would not have acted without cold calculation. In 1994 concerned with the apparent lack of progress on the weapons programme, I gave Brajesh Mishra a draft resolution for the BJP to move in Parliament that the Government of India would continue with its preparations for nuclear weapon capability and would never sign the NPT. A little later, Mishra informed me that when Vajpayee showed the resolution to Rao the latter assured him that the programme was on track and there was no need for such a resolution.
In 1985, Dr Ramanna, as Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and myself as Director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, both members of Rajiv Gandhi’s interdisciplinary group drafted two proposals to be presented to Pakistan – one on no-first-use of nuclear weapons and two, a mutual pledge not to attack each other’s nuclear installations. Rajiv Gandhi favoured both proposals. At that stage, Rao was the Defence Minister. He summoned Dr Ramanna, Dr Arunachalam and me and discussed the proposals. That was the first time I came to realise that Rao was among the few in the decision-making loop on nuclear weapons. He told us that while he was in favour of our proposals in principle, he was against initiating the no-first-use proposal at that stage. His reason: the Prime Minister had done so much of talking on Pakistani nuclear weapons that our offers would lead the Pakistanis to conclude that India was initiating them out of a sense of weakness and fear. Rajiv accepted this logic. So while the proposal on mutual non-attack on each other’s nuclear installations was pursued by Rajiv Gandhi, the no-first-use proposal was dropped for the time being.
In 1994, January, J.N. Dixit was laying down office as Foreign Secretary. He called me up on telephone and told me that he had come back from Pakistan where he presented to the Pakistanis six non-papers. One of them was on an agreement on no-first-use of nuclear capabilities. He said he had carried out what I had been urging for years.
In 1985 I proposed to Rao, then Defence Minister, that our armed forces needed to be educated further on nuclear strategy. My own knowledge of nuclear strategy and my visits to the National Defence College and Wellington Staff College led me to believe that the expertise of our armed forces on nuclear strategy and doctrines should be advanced further. So I suggested that Lt. General Sundarji, then Vice Chief of Army Staff should be requested to prepare an instruction programme on the subject. Again Rao told me ‘not yet’. Sundarji and myself attributed this reluctance to Rao’s then widely believed tendency to avoid decisions. But during my private conversation with Rao during the Kargil hearings, I realised, as a cautious man he was not perhaps willing to launch any step which would tell the world that India had weapons till they were fully ready. His complaint was that till he took over as PM, the Indian weapon effort was not at optimum speed; a complaint that I am in no position to confirm or deny. According to Rao, he bought time till the country was ready and then attempted to go for testing.
I am recording the last two conversations Rao had with me during the Kargil enquiry because of their relevance to history.
Though the credit for the order to assemble the weapon goes to Rajiv Gandhi and the credit for restarting the development programme of the weapon after Morarji Desai halted it belongs to Indira Gandhi, it was Narasimha Rao who operationalised it. In other words, there has been a consistent continuity in the Indian nuclear policy under Congress governments. Even while working hard for nuclear disarmament, Congress prime ministers were hardheaded people who did not put all their eggs only in the basket of nuclear disarmament. During the time when Rao was Prime Minister, when India was under considerable pressure from the US to roll back its nuclear programme, he appears to have kept Vajpayee informed of the progress in the nuclear programme.
The evidence of this is that there was no pressure from the BJP in Parliament on the nuclear issue though there was a widespread impression in the country that the programmes had been slowed down under US pressure. Unfortunately, Rao’s statesmanship in treating the nuclear issue as a nonpartisan national issue did not appear to have been reciprocated by the NDA leadership on the day of the Shakti tests.
The present UPA government in which the Congress party plays the dominant role must prepare a white paper on the evolution of India’s nuclear policy so that there will be necessary continuity in the documentation of the country’s security and foreign policy. This has been advocated by the Kargil Committee.
President Bush has announced Condoleezza Rice as the new Secretary of State in his second term. Her deputy at the National Security Council, Stephen Hadley, has been named as the new National Security Advisor. These two along with John R. Bolton, the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs who serves as Senior Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State for Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament, represent the right wing of the foreign policy establishment. The Rice and Hadley appointments suggest that the President’s effort is to fill crucial cabinet positions with people who ‘know his mind’, thus intending to extend his personal control over agencies he has suspected of impeding his foreign policy aims during his first term in office.
Announcing the first two appointments on November 16, 2004, President Bush confirmed that Rice would be taking office at a critical time when “we are a nation at war”, indicating a certain nuance of the time period. Bush’s second term is expected to be dogged by foreign policy challenges like the ‘war against terrorism’, war in Iraq, threats emanating from Iran and North Korea (proliferation issue), and the fractured trans-Atlantic relationship left over from his first term in office.
Bush’s New Team
Colin Powell’s resignation has removed a moderate voice from the top ranks of the administration. It is feared that this might signal a future ‘aggressive’ foreign policy. In an interview with the Financial Times after the elections Powell had stated that “the President is not going to trim his sails or pull back”, meaning that it was unlikely that the Bush, in his second term, would want to alter, amend or curtail his earlier policies.1 The ‘doomsayers’, believe that Bush’s second term “is likely to produce military intervention overseas, along the lines of Iraq in 2003” and the ‘skeptics’, argue that the second presidential term “will turn out to be more cautious and less belligerent.”2
It seems that Rice, given her strong personal ties with President Bush, will speak directly for him and can take decisions in his name, something that ‘Powell could never do’. She is closer to the President than any Secretary of State since Henry A. Kissinger who served Richard Nixon. Colin Powell’s departure underlines the fact that in his second term, the President is seeking White House influence in the State Department since there is a history of both going different ways. With Rice as the new Secretary of State reflecting ‘America’s face to the world’, the only real counterforce, in the persona of Colin Powell has disappeared. Clearly the Neoconservatives believe that Bush’s second term victory confirms the essential righteousness of their global agenda, beginning with its decision to invade Iraq as part of the ‘war on terrorism’.3
The other most important office has gone to Hadley, who is said to be close to Dick Cheney. John R. Bolton is another Cheney loyalist though it is not clear at time of writing this comment about the office he will assume. The second term’s top ranks seem to be strengthening the hard-line coalition of aggressive nationalists, neo-conservatives and Christian Right that dominated policy-making post-9/11 terrorist attacks on New York and the Pentagon.
Major Issues
This section delves into four major areas of US concern and the probable position on each in the next four years of Bush presidency.
War against Terrorism
After the 9/11 attacks, Washington launched the ‘war on terror’ which began with the Al Qaida, but “it does not end there” as Bush proclaimed, adding with conviction that “it will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”4 Although no terror attack has occurred in the US since 9/11, Osama bin Laden, the prime accused continues to remain elusive. Pakistan, the perpetrator of terrorism, as brought out by the 9/11 Commission Report (“Pakistan did not break with the Taliban until after 9/11, although it was harbouring bin Laden”)5 and the US are trying to further strengthen mutual ties. This ‘engagement’ of Pakistan is a continuation of President Bush’s earlier policy towards its ‘frontline state’. While the highlights of the first term with respect to Pakistan was the famous Camp David visit of President Musharraf (June 2003), the major non-NATO ally (MNNA) status granted to Islamabad (June 2004); the beginning of the second term witnesses the US Congress approving a $300 million military aid package for Pakistan (November 2004). This was the biggest military aid package to Pakistan since 9/11. Given their loyalty to President Bush, the new set of officials ‘who know his mind’ (emphasis added) will give their full cooperation to Washington’s ‘global war against terrorism’.
Middle East
It is expected that the main foreign policy focus in the second term is likely to be the Middle East. The unilateral strike against Iraq in 2003 had set the stage for the administration’s future involvement with the region. The war against Saddam has been in keeping with the policy stand of the neocons dominating the Bush administration during the first term. Rice is criticised for what appeared to be her failures either to warn the President about flawed pre-war intelligence regarding Iraq’s weapons programmes or having made less than consistent efforts to ascertain its accuracy.6 In one of her several statements supporting the ‘unilateral war’ against Iraq, she had commented in September 2003 that high strength aluminium tubes seized en route to Iraq were “only really suited for nuclear weapons programmes,” though almost a year earlier, her staff had been told that the nation’s foremost nuclear experts seriously doubted that the tubes were intended for nuclear weapons.
Being an administration loyalist, Hadley, from the very beginning has supported Washington’s unilateral action against Iraq. He validated the fact that Iraq was in possession of nuclear weapons and had links with the Al Qaida even when the CIA repeatedly pointed out that such a fact was not supported by hard evidence.7
Proliferation/Security
As the world’s strongest nuclear and conventional power, the US intends to freeze weapons development and halt nuclear proliferation. In its quest for ‘absolute national security’, a US $401.7 billion budget proposal for defence in 2005 is underway. In the meantime, Iran and North Korea are being identified as two major challenges to the administration. Both have failed to comply with their safeguards obligations and their unwillingness to respond to repeated calls by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The hawks in the regime are building a case of ominous disclosures about Iran’s nuclear capabilities to make the case that Iran is a threat that must be confronted, either by economic sanctions, military action, or “regime change.” Leading the charge for a tough line on Iran has been Bolton.8 Rice seems to be in a dilemma regarding plan of action against Iran. She is willing to try diplomacy, not certain that it will work and ready to look at other possibilities if it does not.9
In order to deal with North Korea, the Bush Administration established the sixparty talks (August 2003) involving the US, China, Russia, Japan and South Korea to rein in Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons programme. China has the maximum influence over North Korea since it is its largest aid donor and most powerful neighbour. Hence, it is observed that China, a country often seen as an adversary by the US, has leveraged itself into being a significant player in non-proliferation concerns, an indication that the US’ power to contain proliferation single-handedly is waning. In the case of North Korea, the Bush team may not press for a ‘hardline’ since US troops are stationed in South Korea. It is a possibility that Washington will resort to diplomacy in this case also because of the China factor.
As far as US security is concerned, the doctrine of pre-emption is much debated about in policy circles. Rice is one of the central architects of the controversial Bush Doctrine of pre-emptive strike against states thought to be a threat to the US.10 Hadley participated in the National Institute for Public Policy’s study team that produced Rationale and Requirements for US Nuclear Forces and Arms Control, a study that called for the development of “mini”-nuclear weapons and served as a road map for Bush’s Nuclear Posture Review. Prefiguring the preventive national security doctrine of the Bush administration, the report stated: “Under certain circ*mstances, very severe nuclear threats may be needed to deter any of these potential adversaries.”11 Bolton is also a staunch advocate of the revival of ‘star wars’ missile defense system and considers the ‘CTBT dead’ after the Senate voted not to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 12
Trans-Atlantic Relations
Since trans-Atlantic relations already seem fractured over the Iraq issue, probably a Kerry win could have revived the relationship. However, that does not mean that the current administration will further accentuate the divide. A day after winning the elections President Bush in a press briefing on November 4, 2004, emphasised his determination to reach out to a wider audience. His statement reveals his intention to work with ‘friends and allies’ over the next four years. After all, a reinvigorated trans-Atlantic relation to advance common interests and advance global challenges is in the interest of Washington. As long as Europe does not pose as a counterweight to the US, a united Europe can function as Washington’s partner in the global arena.13
It is only but evident that the Bush loyalists will prefer to harp on the same policy direction as their leader. The team would never want it ‘to go alone’ where it can gain the support of allies since ‘greater the cooperation’ will ensure ‘greater chances of limiting other problems across the Atlantic’.
Conclusion
The change of guard in the State Department probably indicates the emergence of a different cabinet, a ‘true kitchen cabinet’. Condoleezza Rice along with Stephen Hadley and John Bolton led by President Bush may steer a foreign policy direction different from the first term. The second term faces challenges from Iran, North Korea apart from Iraq, which is basically a legacy inherited from the earlier term. Whether Iran or North Korea, it seems that the new team backed by the ‘hardliners’ may press for a ‘coercive’ policy towards the other two ‘axis of evil’ States. The other pressing agenda of the second term may be a stronger, more effective proliferation policy. The new team-mates seem to be strong advocates of Washington’s pursuance of NMD, revival of ‘star wars’ and development of ‘mini’ nukes.
As far as US’ policy towards India is concerned, no major overhaul may be expected, though many analysts are of the belief that Indo-US relations will further improve with Condoleezza Rice as the new Secretary of State. The trajectory of future US foreign policy direction will reveal the strategic orientation of the new Bush administration comprising of the President himself along with his distinguished team-mates.
References/End Notes
- 1. “US to Remain ‘Aggressive Abroad”. BBC News, November 9, 2004
- 2. Lobe, Jim, “Springtime for Spooks” at http://ipsnews.net/interna.asp?idnews=26221
- 3. Lobe, Jim, “US Election: New Bush Foreign Policy Posture Unlikely”, IPS News Agency. November 5, 2004 at http://ipsnews.net/interna.asp/idnews=26152
- 4. Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ news/releases/200/09/2001 0920-8.html, September 20, 2001.
- 5. The 9/11 Commission Report. Final Report on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. Executive Summary. 2004. p.7.
- 6. Purdum, S. Todd, “From Behind the Scenes, Rice on Stage”, The New York Times. November 16, 2004.
- 7. Stephen J. Hadley, 19.11.2004 at http://rightweb.irc-online.org/ind/hadley/hadley.php
- 8. Weisman, R. Steven, “Bush Confronts New Challenge on Issue of Iran”, New York Times, November 19, 2004 at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/19/international/middleeast/ 19diplo.html?oref=login&th=&pagewanted=print&position=
- 9. Ibid.
- 10. Supporting pre-emptive strike against Iraq, Rice had stated that ‘we do not have to sit and wait for mushroom cloud’, indicating that US must deal with threats before they hurt the American people, a concern demonstrated by President Bush several times. For details refer to Blix, Hans, Disarming Iraq. p. 148.
- 11. Stephen J. Hadley, 19.11.2004 at http://rightweb.irc-online.org/ind/hadley/hadley.php
- 12. John R. Bolton at http://www.fpif.org/republicanrule/officials_body.html#bolton. November 24, 2004.
- 13. Bereuter, Doug, Lis, John, “Broadening the Transatlantic Relationship”, Washington Quarterly, Winter 2003-04, p. 150.
Yasser Arafat’s death on November 11, 2004, sparked off apprehensions regarding consequent political turmoil, civil war, increase in violence, confusion over future leadership and a subsequent state of chaos and anarchy in Palestine. However, to the surprise of the Israeli and international media, these perceptions were rebutted by the formation of a unified leadership1 and participation of a majority of Palestinian factions, working collectively, though cautiously, towards the presidential election scheduled for January 9, 2005.
As was expected Mahmoud Abbas, popularly known as Abu Mazen, won comfortably by getting 62.3 per cent of the votes in the election that was relatively free and fair. Abbas, a moderate leader, also heads the dominant political faction Fatah2 and faces an internal dilemma - of establishing a Palestinian democracy by taking the first and most important step of curbing extremist activities of militant factions. There are, nonetheless, certain discrepancies and deeper problems embedded in this fractured political system, which have to be tackled solely by the Palestinians in order to achieve their ultimate goal of a Palestinian State.
Arafat and the Palestinian cause: Till death not do us part
The Palestinians are still trying to overcome the shock of the demise of Yasser Arafat, the symbol of Palestinian nationalism and struggle. Greatly revered by all Palestinians, irrespective of their party or political affiliations, Arafat carried enough weight to influence grassroots opinion. Despite Israeli and American efforts to sideline Arafat, his struggle towards achievement of a Palestinian state was held in high esteem by the Palestinians, especially for bringing their cause to the forefront of international politics. It was, however, the 1987 intifada (uprising) in the West Bank that brought Arafat back from political hibernation and eventually in 1994 he became the head of the newly constituted Palestinian Authority (PA). Arafat subsequently installed most of his contemporaries, who were in exile in Tunis (known as ‘Tunisians’), in major posts in the PA.
As the ‘sole’ leader of Palestine, Arafat before his death wore four different hats: he was the elected President (al-ra’is) of the Palestinian Authority (PA), the head of the interim government on the West Bank and Gaza Strip; the chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO)3; and head of the Fatah, which represents the mainstream Palestinian national movement and is the major faction within the PLO. However, in recent past, Arafat had come under attack and scrutiny by the Palestinians on charges of corruption, nepotism, cronyism, autocracy and repression. His mode of working included concentration of all power and authority in his hands, and he was known for keeping even close confidantes and co-party members on a short leash. This is also evident by the fact that he did not groom or encourage any co-party member to succeed him. Consequently, Arafat was politically ostracised by the Israelis and Americans, who refused to accept him as a leader and negotiating partner.
Mahmoud Abbas’ election campaign and eventual victory was ironically emblematic of the ‘godfather’ legacy that Arafat left behind. Differing views between them particularly over the use of violence and deep schisms in perceptions and political vision led Abbas to resign from the Prime Minister’s post in September 2003. However, Abbas had to use Arafat’s symbolism during his campaign in order to appease the Palestinian populace for votes.
Palestinian politics has, as a result, not been devoid of contradictions, confusion and political chaos. This was very apparent following Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s announcement of the disengagement plan (February 2004), which saw various Palestinian factions grappling for a future share in power. July 2004 also witnessed a violent power struggle in the Gaza between the ‘old guard’4of the PA led by Arafat and his coterie and a younger generation of militiamen5, disillusioned and upset by the corruption rampant in the PA. The run up to the elections underscored these divisions and portrayed an agitated atmosphere of heightened emotions, unstable political conditions, sporadic security lapses and an alarming anxiety amongst the Palestinians over the Israeli and American roles in shaping their future.
Arafat’s era, nonetheless, witnessed certain continuity, consistency and predictability in Palestine, as well as in its relations with Israel. Paradoxically, this created an atmosphere of impasse characterised by violent acts by Hamas and other militant groups on the one hand, and military operations by Israel on the other. The American role in stimulating the peace process came to naught as both the Israelis and the Palestinians failed to curb violence. Arafat’s death led to the reopening of the peace process and the promise of establishing a Palestinian state by the end of 2005.
Mahmoud Abbas: The Lone Crusader?
Mahmoud Abbas, after taking over the mantle of the President of the PA, faces numerous challenges, most of which have been the main cause of contention between Israel and Palestine: the implementation of the Road Map (2003)6, the possibility of a Palestinian state, Israel’s commitments on the disengagement plan, role of the Hamas and other groups, internal stability and curbing of violence.
Abbas, a ‘Tunisian’ is regarded as a pragmatist and an outspoken critic of violence (especially against the ‘armed’ aspect of the intifada) and was a key architect of the Oslo Accords. He has reiterated the key positions of Arafat, such as the formation of an independent Palestinian state, right of return of the refugees, the status of East Jerusalem, Israel’s disengagement from the Gaza and the West Bank, discontinuing the construction of the Israeli wall and redrawing of boundaries according to the pre-1967 border.
He is well liked by the Americans and is supported by the Arab states. He seems, therefore, to be in a politically comfortable position to negotiate with the Israelis. At the same time, Israel too has demonstrated a willingness to conduct a dialogue with him. For a change, the circ*mstances are quite conducive for a negotiated settlement, and the onus is on Mahmoud Abbas to devise a strategy for working out the best deal for the Palestinians. In all likelihood, he will try to strike a balance between internal compulsions and external pressures.
Internal challenges, like restructuring the security services7 and curtailing their unlawful activities, will definitely demand a stringent approach. To gather all these incongruous elements under the umbrella of an organised political structure, Abbas will need unprecedented support and require major compromises from the Palestinians, to accomplish the eventual goal of establishing a truly independent Palestinian state. But his immediate task will be to address concrete matters related to internal development and stabilisation of the Palestinian society.8 In addition, he will undoubtedly face opposition within the Fatah, particularly from Arafat’s ‘Tunisian’ co-party members who are unlikely to relinquish hold on their currently held powerful positions.
Hamas and Islamic Jihad: Compelled Participants
Hamas and Islamic Jihad, the main militant groups operating in Palestinian territories, boycotted the presidential elections, while at the same time calling for evolving a mechanism of ‘joint’ leadership in which they could play a part. Hamas is an extremely popular Islamist movement, which operates through its distinct, yet interlocked, political and military wings. An arch adversary of Israel, its leaders have been repeatedly targeted by the Israeli forces, whose sole aim has been to decapitate the group.9 However, its resilience and capability to recuperate simply reinforces Israeli fears that Hamas will continue to attack Israeli civilians, irrespective of any talks of truce and ceasefire.
Hamas is divided over the issue of a speculated ceasefire between its leaders in the West Bank and Gaza. Since the peace that is on offer is perceived by them as an attempt at consolidating Israeli control over the territories by other means rather than a genuine peace deal, they are, therefore, of the firm opinion that Israel will not voluntarily dismantle the settlements, share their control over Jerusalem, give up the water resources it now controls or agree to lift the economic restrictions that currently constrain Palestinian trade with third countries. Instead, Hamas believes that Israel will prevaricate while using the PA as a substitute security force.10
However, Hamas’ participation in the Municipal Elections on December 23, 2004 has obligated them to enter into the political process. Mahmoud Abbas will have to work arduously towards a ceasefire with the militant elements by either reaching an agreement with them or by combating them. The former approach seems to be more practical for achieving political cooperation and sharing power between Hamas and the PA. Thus, continuous attack on Israeli civilians will only weaken Hamas’ political legitimacy and undermine its role in the future.
Conclusion
Many view Mahmoud Abbas’ victory with cautious optimism. But a majority on both sides does envisage the onset of a peace process, however slow it might be, rather than regression. However, a long-term peace process would require both the Israeli and Palestinian leadership to compromise in order to settle the complex issues that confront them. Israel will be expected to withdraw to the pre-1967 borders, more or less, dismantle the settlements, re-route the fence, give up East Jerusalem, and finally come to an agreement over the right of return of Palestinian refugees. Abbas, on the other hand, will have to take responsibility to curb violent extremist factions, outline a ceasefire and restructure the internal state of affairs. Both Sharon and Abbas are confronted with extremist elements - Israeli right-wingers and settlers, and Palestinian fundamentalist and Islamic radicals - who act as a stumbling block to peaceful resolution.
Sharon who had previously avoided any negotiation with Arafat appears more inclined to hold talks now with a ‘legitimate’ partner in power. A unified leadership for the Palestinians, however, would imply calling an end to all militant and ‘terrorist’ acts, stronger ties with the US and meeting the Israeli and American demands. Mahmoud Abbas will have to couple pragmatism and moderation with strength and perseverance to sketch out a more stable and less chaotic future for the Palestinians – an elusive future which the Palestinians have been yearning for without much success.
However, the role of potential external actors like the US has wider agendas, than just pushing for elections or establishing democracy in the occupied territories. Elections, according to Bush Jr. would help in the formation of a Palestinian state in a more peaceful and prescribed manner. Nevertheless, a focus on the Middle-East peace process would help him in shifting attention from Iraq for a while, demonstrate his capability to usher in democracy (atleast in one part of the region) and gain more influence in Palestinian internal politics. However, the Bush regime has to re-order its priorities; concentrate on the internal stability in Palestine and assist in shaping an atmosphere conducive for talks between Sharon and Abbas.
Winning the elections was an easier task for Mahmoud Abbas as compared to dealing with the ground realities in the post-election period. What would be challenging for him are the politico-security issues that require immediate attention. The next few months will indeed be a testing time for the Palestinians – outlining the contours of their future from the little they are offered and the little they might finally get.
References/End Notes
- 1. On November 11, former Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas became the new Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), while Parliament Speaker Rawih Fattouh emerged as the President of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Under the Palestinian basic law, he can hold office for 60 days during which time elections should be held. Farouk Kaddoumi, the Tunis based chief of PLO’s political department, is the new head of the Fatah. See “Polls in Palestine”, The Hindu, New Delhi. November 19, 2004.
- 2. Fatah represents the mainstream Palestinian national movement and is the major and dominant faction within the PLO.
- 3. The PLO was formed in 1964 as an umbrella organisation dedicated for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. In 1968, Arafat became the chairman of the PLO.
- 4. This “old guard” or the Tunis gang comprises of the majority of Arafat’s compatriots who returned with him to the West Bank in 1994.
- 5. Members of the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, the armed wing associated with the Fatah was responsible for spearheading violence for reformation in the PA.
- 6. The most recent proposal of peace was in the form of the Roadmap, which was launched in June 2003 by the quartet comprising of U.S., Russia, United Nations, and the European Union. It is a goal driven, phase-by-phase route to bring about a solution between Israel and Palestine in two years.
- 7. These security forces, all a part of the Fatah, broke away and started functioning as armed groups. Their modus operandi resulted in violent infighting and criminal activities.
- 8. Reform, security for the citizens, growing poverty, unemployment, tackling corruption within the PA, streamlining the disorganized security services and overall development of the Palestinian society.
- 9. The killing of Sheikh Yassin in March 2004 and Abd al-Aziz Rantissi in April 2004 was a clear sign.
- 10. Gunning, Jeroen, “Peace with Hamas? The Transforming Potential of Political Participation”, International Affairs 80, 2, 2004, p. 233.
